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Comment

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and Section 707(b):
Should the Subjective "Substantial Abuse"
Standard Be Replaced by an Objective
"Means-testing" Formula?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Because our society has become more and more reliant on the concept
of "credit," the level of individual indebtedness has risen and, as a direct
corollary, individual filings for bankruptcy relief have also increased.'
Credit can be beneficial to John D. Consumer ("Consumer")2 by allowing
him to take possession of goods and pay for them at a later date. This
in turn stimulates the economy by giving consumers more buying power.
However, when Consumer fails to use discretion in his use of credit, he
quickly finds out how the seemingly wonderful concept of credit can
become a nightmare. If Consumer becomes insolvent he may begin to
consider various options to resolve his situation, one of which is to file

1. See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105 (1999).
2. The Author is referring to individual consumers as opposed to corporate consumers.
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bankruptcy.3 However, even if he is not insolvent, he still has the
option of filing bankruptcy.4
In the United States, the consumer bankruptcy system began in 1898
with the "advent of a permanent federal bankruptcy law, and a
discharge law similar to that still in effect today."5 The Bankruptcy Act
of 18986 "remained on the books for eighty years."7 Nevertheless, since
its inception, the consumer bankruptcy system has not remained static.
When this country was in the grasp of the Great Depression, "Congress
passed a variety of 'reorganization' laws designed to help debtors retain
their property or businesses."' These reorganization laws substituted
equity receiverships, previously the primary means of effecting
reorganizations. 9 In 1978 Congress restructured bankruptcy procedure
and bankruptcy courts by enacting the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act °
(the "Act")." Substantively, the Act created Title 11 of the United
States Code or the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). 12 Congress remains
free to amend the Code as it sees fit or, probably, to amend as pressure
from different segments from our economic society is exerted. This is
evidenced by two major revisions in 1984 and 1994.13
The Code is presently divided into the following chapters: One, Three,
Five, Seven, Nine, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen. 14 Chapters One,

3. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) defines insolvency as the condition that exists when a debtor's
liabilities fairly discounted exceed its assets. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2000).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 109 sets forth the criteria of a "debtor" in order to file bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. § 109 (2000). A Chapter 9 bankruptcy exists for municipalities. Id. 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(c) establishes that a municipality must be insolvent to file a Chapter 9 petition. 11
U.S.C. § 109(c). "The absence of any mention of insolvency in other parts of § 109 creates
the negative inference that other debtors need not be insolvent to be eligible for
bankruptcy." DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 8 (3d. ed. Foundation
Press 2001).
5. Charles Jordan Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1991) [hereinafter "HistoricalEvolution"].
6. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Chandler Act, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
7. CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICE

59 (Anderson Publishing Co. 2003).

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered Sections of
U.S.C.)
11. BAIRD, supra note 4, at 5.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
13. Id.
14. In 1986, as a result of financial pressure facing small farmers in America, Congress
created Chapter 12 solely for "family farmers" as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) so these
farm debtors would have the opportunity to reorganize. The original Act contained a "sun-
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Three, and Five are chapters of general applicability; whereas, Chapters
Seven, Nine, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen address specific bankruptcy
5
The Code is
procedures for liquidation or reorganization of debt.'
structured in a way that enables a debtor's affairs to be worked out in
a single forum. 6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334,"7 "[flederal district
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all 'cases' under Title
U1." 8 However, "[b]ankruptcy courts are adjuncts of the district courts"
and 28 U.S.C. § 1334,'9 read in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 157(a),
"allows the district court to 'refer' any or all bankruptcy cases to
bankruptcy judges." 20 This language authorizing district court judges
to refer bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy judges has become a firmly
institutionalized practice with practically all bankruptcy petitions being
filed in bankruptcy courts.2 '
When an individual files for bankruptcy he normally has two primary
choices: (1) Chapter 7 liquidation or (2) Chapter 13 "wage earner's
plan."22 Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 facilitate relief for individual
consumers, whereas other chapters address types of reorganization-Chapter 9 for a municipality; Chapter 11 for business; and
Chapter 12 for family farmers. Despite both of these forms of debtor
relief (Chapter 7 and Chapter 13) having their respective qualities, to an
individual debtor, Chapter 7 is often considered the more attractive of
the two because of its "fresh start" concept. A Chapter 7 debtor, who
offers his non-exempt assets, if any, for liquidation so a distribution can
be made of the proceeds to his creditors, is relieved of all liabilities and
is entitled to a financial clean slate completely unencumbered by prepetition liabilities subject to discharge.2 ' Because there generally is not
a bright-line test or any other objective criteria requisite to filing a
Chapter 7 petition, many debtors file under this section despite having
the ability to pay a portion of their debts out of future income (i.e., under

down provision," which has been extended several times. Despite these extensions Chapter
12 is not a permanent part of the Code. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 71.
15. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 76-77.
16. BAIRD, supra note 4, at 20.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
18. BAIRD, supra note 4, at 20.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
20. BAIRD, supra note 4, at 25.
21. Id.
22. Chapter 13 is often referred to as a Wage Earners Plan because the debtor
(generally an individual) is able to consolidate debt and structure payment over a period
of time.
23. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 66. It should be noted that under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a), 727(b) certain pre-petition obligations are not dischargeable in Chapter 7. See
11 U.S.C. 88 523(a), 727(b) (2000).
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a Chapter 13 wage earner's plan).24 Further, 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) only
authorizes the involuntary commencement of a Chapter 7 or a Chapter
11 case.25
Thus, concerned creditors cannot force an individual
consumer debtor into a Chapter 13. A debtor can only voluntarily file
a petition under Chapter 13.26 This
dilemma is often referred to as the
27
problem of the "Can-Pay" debtor.
In response to the influential concerns of the consumer credit industry,
in 1984 Congress attempted to alleviate the "Can-Pay" debtor problem
by adding § 707(b) to the Code. 28 This section authorizes bankruptcy
courts to dismiss a Chapter 7 case if the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) the debtor is an "individual" within the meaning of the Code; (2) the
debts are primarily consumer debts; and (3) the court finds the filing
was a "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 proceedings. 29
Normally,
whether a debtor is an individual and whether his debts are consumer
in nature are questions that are easily determined by the courts. On the
other hand, the "substantial abuse" provision has been subject to
inconsistent interpretation. As Part II of this Comment will demonstrate, the elements of "substantial abuse" have been left to judges'
discretion; and Congress has provided little guidance as to the exact
conduct this phrase was intended to prevent. Consequently, there has
been a wide variation in the methods courts use to determine "substantial abuse" under § 707(b).
The primary method proposed to address the Can-Pay debtor problem
is "means-testing."30
Although "means-testing," as a concept, has
various formulations, in essence, the idea is to remove some of the
discretion judges currently have and institute some form of objective
criteria by which an individual debtor would be evaluated and possibly
precluded from proceeding under Chapter 7. Those debtors who have
the financial means to repay some specified portion of their debts in the
future will be forced into Chapter 13. Part III of this Comment will
focus on means-testing as a resolution to the "Can-Pay" debtor problem.
Prior to 1984 the consumer credit industry lobbied for Congress to
address the Can-Pay debtor problem."' Congress's response was the

24. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 108-09.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000).
26. See id.
27. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 108 (the term "Can-Pay" debtor is often used
to describe an individual debtor who files a Chapter Seven petition despite having the
means to fund a Chapter 13 payment plan).
28. In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2001).
30. BAIRD, supra note 4, at 108.
31. See Lamanna, 153 F.3d at 3.
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enactment of § 707(b). 2 Now, however, because the credit industry
perceives § 707(b) as ineffective, it is again pressuring Congress to
institute some additional safe guards that will bar certain individuals
from filing under Chapter 7 (i.e., means-testing).33 But even if the
industry's concerns are justified, is the consumer credit industry really
blameless in the creation of this problem? Further, if they are to blame,
is there a way industry policy, and not legislation, could alleviate the
"Can-Pay" debtor problem? Parts IV and V of this Comment will
address these questions.
II.

SECTION 707(B) AND "SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE": JUDGES CALL IT How

THEY SEE IT

A.

The Attraction of Chapter 7

The modern era of bankruptcy law began in 1898 when Congress
enacted the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.34 The inception of the modern era
of bankruptcy law ushered in "a strong and unmistakenly debtor-friendly
posture"35 as demonstrated by the 1898 Bankruptcy Act providing "few
grounds for denying discharge." 36 The American consumer bankruptcy
system was based on the idea that all honest individual debtors should
have an immediate and unconditional discharge freely-available "in
37
exchange for the surrender of current non-exempt [sic] assets, if any."
Today, the idea of a freely-available, immediate, and unconditional
discharge, contingent upon the surrender of non-exempt assets, remains
alive (Chapter 7 liquidation), although its future health is questionable.
Present bankruptcy laws provide consumer debtors with options of how
they would like to proceed in bankruptcy.38 The debtor chooses the
bankruptcy relief option that best effectuates his purposes and goals, not
the needs of the creditors.39 The primary options available to an
individual consumer debtor are the filing of a Chapter 7 liquidation
petition or a Chapter 13 wage-earner's plan.4" Although Chapter 13

32. Id.
33. Brenda Anthony, "SubstantialAbuse" Under Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code:
American Consumers Learn DeclaringBankruptcy May Cease to be a Way Out, 67 U. CIN.
L. REV. 535, 561 (1999).
34. See Tabb, HistoricalEvolution, supra note 5, at 326.
35. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 6 (2001) [hereinafter Death of Consumer Bankruptcy].
36. Tabb, Historical Evolution, supra note 5, at 365.
37. Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 6.
38. See id. at 7-9.
39. See id. at 8.
40. Id. at 7-8.

1390

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

consolidates debts and structures a payout over time before entry of a
discharge, a Chapter 7 case results in an immediate discharge of prepetition liabilities, and thus enables the debtor to have a "fresh start."
This apparent windfall appears to have minimal procedural safeguards
in that there are no limitations prohibiting an individual debtor from
filing Chapter 7 other than §§ 707(a) and (b).41 Further, those safeguards that are present are inconsistently interpreted, as we will see
later.
In essence, when a debtor files a Chapter 13 petition, the debtor is
agreeing to surrender future earnings for a specified period of time,
hence the label, wage-earner's plan. In order for the court to confirm a
Chapter 13 plan, the debtor must demonstrate that unsecured creditors
will be paid at least the amount that the unsecured creditors would
receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7.42 Generally, this is
referred to as the "best interest" test.43 Consequently, the analysis of
any Chapter 13 case concerns a measure of the debtor's nonexempt
assets available for liquidation. As a general rule, if after this analysis
it is determined that unsecured creditors will be paid more under a
Chapter 13 plan, it is presumed these unsecured creditors would prefer
the debtor proceed under Chapter 13 as opposed to Chapter 7.44
Nevertheless, proceeding under Chapter 13 is entirely at the debtor's
discretion. 45 Thus, "[a] debtor ... is free to play [his] strengths in
choosing the appropriate chapter under which to file."4'
Considering these strengths, proceeding under Chapter 13 only makes
sense if the debtor not only desires to retain his nonexempt assets, but
also is willing to surrender his future earnings for a specific period of
time.47 Then again, if the debtor "has significant future earning

41. Section 707(a) allows the court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for cause, after notice
and hearing, for the following reasons:
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under section 123 of title 28; and (3) failure
of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time
as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the
information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a motion by the
United States trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2002). 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) allows dismissal for "substantial abuse." 11
U.S.C. § 707(b). The specific text of this subsection and its application will be more fully
elaborated upon in Part II of this Comment.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(4) (2000).
43. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 212.
44. Id. at 70.
45. 11. U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000).
46. Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 8.
47. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 70.
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capacity but few existing nonexempt assets, she would choose chapter
7V48 A Chapter 7 liquidation could result in a complete discharge of
most of the debtor's pre-petition liabilities and entitle the debtor to a
"fresh start," despite the fact that the debtor has significant future
earning capacity.4 9 This aspect of Chapter 7 is quite favorable to
debtors as "[tihe most valuable 'asset' most consumer debtors possess is
their earning capacity."5 0 As a result, a sophisticated debtor (such as
a professional) would likely choose to liquidate his currently held
nonexempt assets and enjoy the bountiful fruits of his future labors.
Although Chapter 13 confirmation is contingent upon unsecured
creditors receiving amounts at least equal to that which they would
receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation, there is no equivalent analysis for
a debtor who is seeking relief in Chapter 751 Nonetheless, § 707
ensures unsecured creditors are not left totally unprotected, 52 although
the creditors would argue otherwise as evidenced by their demands upon
Congress for reform.5"
Another potential attraction for debtors arises in the aftermath of a
Chapter 7 discharge with the debtor's immediate filing of a petition
under Chapter 13. This sequence of filings is commonly known as a
"Chapter Twenty."54 It should be noted that the Code does not actually
contain a Chapter Twenty. The sequence of filings came to be known as
a Chapter Twenty because of basic arithmetic-seven plus thirteen
equals twenty. The debtor files a Chapter 7 petition, liquidates his
assets and receives a discharge.55 Subsequently, the debtor immediately files a Chapter 13 petition to discharge any remaining liabilities or to
structure payment for certain debts not discharged in the prior Chapter
a matter of law, such as taxes, child support, or alimony
7 case as
56
arrears.
A typical Chapter Twenty case "contains a serial chapter [Thirteen]
case filed only after the bankruptcy court closes the initial chapter
[Seven]."57 However, "[in more complex cases ... the successive

48. Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 8.
49. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 68.
50. Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 8.
51. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(4), 727(b).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 707.
53. Anthony, supra note 33, at 561.
54. United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 2004).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Lex Coleman, Individual Consumer "Chapter 20" Cases After Johnson: An
Introduction to Nonbusiness Serial Filings Under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of The
Bankruptcy Code, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 357, 357-58 (1992).
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chapter [Thirteen] filing occurs while the prior chapter [Seven] case is
still pending."58 Either way, the utilization of a Chapter Twenty
enables the debtor
to extend or reimpose the automatic stay, to discharge under chapter
[Thirteen] debts surviving the discharge in a prior chapter [Seven]
case, and to either delay or avoid foreclosures by curing arrearages
under subsequent chapter [Thirteen] plans of certain secured debts
actually discharged [or reaffirmed] in a prior chapter [Seven] case.59
Perhaps the most significant advantage of the foregoing is the ability
of the debtor to discharge debts in Chapter 13 that survived (i.e., were
nondischargeable) Chapter 7. Chapter 13 contains a "super-discharge"
provision in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a),60 which discharges a broader range of
Basically, § 1328(a) allows the
obligations than in Chapter 7.61
chapter 13, except: debts "for
under
discharge of all pre-petition debts
alimony and support (§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2)); student loans (§§ 523(a)(8)), 1328(a)(2)); DUI-related debts (§§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2)); and
restitution or a criminal fine included in a sentence on the debtor's
criminal conviction (§ 1328(a)(3), see § 523(a)(7))."62 On the contrary,
a discharge of pre-petition liabilities under Chapter 763 is subject to all
the limitations enumerated in § 523.6
In Johnson v. Home State Bank,65 the Supreme Court ruled that the
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly bar filings resulting in a Chapter
Twenty. 66 In coming to this conclusion, the Court reasoned that while
"Congress ha[d] expressly prohibited various forms of serial filings," it
neglected to place a specific provision or section prohibiting Chapter

58. Id. at 358.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000).
61. Section 1328(a) provides that after the debtor has completed all payments under
the plan,
the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan
or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any debt-(1) provided for
under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; (2) of the kind specified in paragraph (5), (8),
or (9) of section 523(a) of this title; or (3) for restitution, or a criminal fine,
included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000). Notice that under § 1328(a)(2) most of the exceptions to
discharge listed in § 523(a) are subject to discharge in Chapter 13. Whereas, under
Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) contemplates that all of the § 523(a) exceptions apply and
are thus nondischargeable in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 523(a).
62. TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 511.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 727; 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
65. 501 U.S. 78 (1992).
66. Id. at 87.
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Twenty filings.6" Therefore, the absence of a similar, specific prohibition on Chapter Twenty filings, "combined with the evident care with
which Congress fashioned ... express prohibitions, convince[d] [the
Court] that Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit
of Chapter [Thirteen] reorganization to a debtor who previously filed for
Chapter [Seven] relief.""8
Despite the Supreme Court's holding that the Bankruptcy Code does
not expressly prohibit Chapter Twenty filings, § 707(b) is still present
and it endows the bankruptcy judge with discretion as to what
constitutes "substantial abuse." The question, therefore, becomes: Is it
"substantial abuse" under § 707(b) to file Chapter 7 when the debtor has
made an objective indication that he intends to file a Chapter 13 petition
before or immediately after being discharged in Chapter 7?69
B.

Section 707(b): The "SubstantialAbuse" of Chapter 7

The statutory wording of § 707(b) is important in order for the reader
to appropriately appreciate the disparity in the application of "substantial abuse." Section 707(b) provides, in pertinent part, the following:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of
any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds
that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the
provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of
granting the relief requested by the debtor."
Initially, a few specific points should be highlighted. First, only the
bankruptcy court itself or the United States Trustee can file a motion
On the statute's face, a
under § 707(b) for "substantial abuse."7
creditor cannot move the court to dismiss the Chapter 7 case no matter
how unfair it may perceive the circumstances. However, a disgruntled

67. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) ("no filings within 180 days of dismissal"); § 727(a)(8)
("no filings within six years of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 filing"); § 727(a)(9) ("limitation
on Chapter 7 filing within six years of Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 filing")).
68. Id.
69. The Author realizes that the question may be better phrased with reference to 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3): Whether it is "bad faith" to file a Chapter 13 petition after being
discharged under Chapter 7? Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the debtor has made
it clear to either the trustee, his creditors, or the court during the pendency of his Chapter
7 case that he intends to file Chapter 13 immediately before or after discharge, this
question of "substantial abuse" under § 707(b) becomes salient.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (emphasis added).

71. See id.
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creditor might bring an abusive situation to the attention of the court
hoping the court will dismiss sua sponte. Second, debts must be
"consumer debt[s]" 72 (i.e., debts incurred primarily for personal purposes).7' Third, "substantial abuse" is neither defined in the Code, nor is
it unambiguously clear from the context of § 707(b) as to how "substantial abuse" should be applied.74 This is not surprising considering that
"[slection 707(b) reflects the tension between the fundamental policy
concern of the Bankruptcy Code, granting the debtor an opportunity for
a fresh start, and the interest of the creditors in stemming abuse of
consumer credit."7 5 The ambiguity in § 707(b) demonstrates "Congress's inability to agree on a definition of substantial abuse which
would encompass these countervailing considerations in all situations."76
Courts have attempted to resolve these countervailing
considerations, and the resulting ambiguity, by emphasizing different
factors in their application of "substantial abuse."7 7 Lastly, there is a
presumption of allowing the debtor to proceed under Chapter 7.75
Thus, a court must evaluate a case objectively and have identifiable
reasons for dismissing a Chapter 7 case under § 707(b). In their
respective attempts at objective evaluation, United States Courts of
Appeals have utilized three primary tests in establishing "substantial
abuse": (1) Per se Ability to Pay Rule; (2) Totality of the Circumstances;
and (3) Hybrid Approach. Each of these approaches will be addressed
separately.
7 9 the
1. Per se Rule: Debtor's Ability to Pay. In In re Harris,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit solidified its
position that the sole consideration for determining "substantial abuse"
under § 707(b) is the debtor's ability to pay.80 In this case, the Harrises filed a Chapter 7 petition and submitted schedules.81
The

72. See id.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2000).
74. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 707(b).
75. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1991).
76. Id.
77. See In re Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the debtor's ability
to pay under a Chapter 13 plan determines "substantial abuse" under § 707(b)). But see
Green, 934 F.2d at 572 (holding that "substantial abuse" under § 707(b) should not be
based solely on the debtor's ability to finance a Chapter 13 plan, but the court should
instead look at the "totality of the circumstances").
78. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (stating "[tihere shall be a presumption in favor of granting the
relief requested by the debtor.").
79. Harris, 960 F.2d at 74.

80. Id. at 76.
81. Id. at 75.
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schedules "showed unsecured debts of $9,735, assets other than real
property of $7,295, net monthly income of $2,249 and monthly expenses
of $1,973. "s2 Subsequently, the trustee moved to dismiss the debtors'
petition for substantial abuse under § 707(b). This motion was denied
by the bankruptcy court because, as it interpreted "substantial abuse,"
the moving party must demonstrate not only that the debtor has the
ability to pay a significant portion of unsecured debt under a three year
Chapter 13 plan, but also that the debtor's filing constituted "egregious
behavior" (i.e., fraud or bad faith).838 4The court concluded there was no
evidence of such egregious behavior.
The district court reversed, rejecting "the bankruptcy court's holding
that dismissal .

.

. under § 707(b) requires the moving party to show

'egregious behavior' by the debtor."8 5 The district court found dismissal
appropriate because the Harrises' "actual disposable income would
'enable [them] to pay approximately 156 percent of their unsecured debt
over three years."' 86 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.87 The Eighth Circuit relied on their decision in In re
Walton"8 in which the court rejected the debtor's argument that
"substantial abuse" should be equated with "bad faith." 9 The court
believed this interpretation to be "cramped" "because it 'would drastically reduce the bankruptcy courts' ability to dismiss cases filed by debtors
The court
who are not dishonest, but who are also not needy.' 9
explicitly rejected the adoption of a "totality of the circumstances"
approach; it subsequently determined that the debtor's ability to pay his
debts alone justifies a § 707(b) dismissal for substantial abuse.9 '
The court purported to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re
Kelly, 9 wherein the Ninth Circuit stated that, "'[tihe debtor's ability to
pay his debts when due as determined by his ability to fund a chapter
[Thirteen] plan is the primary factor to be considered in determining
whether granting relief would be substantial abuse."'93 The court did

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 78.
866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
Harris,960 F.2d at 77.

90. Id. at 76 (quoting In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1989)).
91.
92.
93.
Ninth

Id.
841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
Harris,960 F.2d at 76-77 (quoting In re Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914-15). Although the
Circuit did make the cited statement, it has not adopted the per se rule as applied
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acknowledge that considerations of the petitioner's good faith were
did "not contemplate ... sweeping
applicable, but such considerations
94
and free ranging inquiry."
Therefore, under the per se rule, the primary focus in the substantial
abuse inquiry is the debtor's ability to pay. 5 The "ability to pay for
§ 707(b) purposes is measured by evaluating a debtors financial
condition in a hypothetical Chapter [Thirteen] proceeding."9 6 There is
no analysis of circumstantial factors surrounding the petitioner's filing
of Chapter 7. If the debtor has such an ability to pay, this factor alone
is a sufficient reason to dismiss under § 707(b) for "substantial
abuse."97 This rule has been closely adhered to by lower courts in the
Eighth Circuit. 98
2. Totality of the Circumstances. In In re Green,99 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the per se rule,
opting instead to evaluate "substantial abuse" under § 707(b) by looking
at the "totality of the circumstances." 1° Here, Green filed a petition
for relief under Chapter 7.1' After reviewing Green's case, the trustee
found Green to have "income of $638 ... in excess of the income
required to pay his necessary expenses." 112 Subsequently, the trustee
filed a motion to dismiss Green's Chapter 7 case for "substantial abuse"
under § 707(b). The bankruptcy court granted this motion based on the
proposition that possession of income in excess of the debtor's necessary
expenses, standing alone, was sufficient to constitute "substantial
abuse." Thereafter, Green appealed. 0 3
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by examining the background
of § 707(b) and its purpose. 1°4 It determined the ambiguity to be the
logical result of the juxtaposition between the Bankruptcy Code's debtor
"fresh start" policy and the consumer credit industry's interest in curbing

in Harris. In fact, the Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted a "hybrid approach" as
illustrated in In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004).
94.

Harris,960 F.2d at 77.

95. In re Koch, 109 F.3d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1996).
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. See In re Downin, 284 B.R. 909 (N.D. Iowa 2002); In re Wessels, 311 B.R. 851
(N.D. Iowa 2004).
99. 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991).
100. Id. at 573.
101. Id. at 569.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 570.
104. Id. at 570-71.
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abuse of Chapter 7.115 The court noted the Ninth Circuit's adherence
to the per se rule but declined to follow.1"6 Instead, the court adopted
the "totality of the circumstances" approach in which the following
factors are considered:
(1) [wihether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden
illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) [w]hether the debtor
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of
his ability to repay; (3) [wlhether the debtor's proposed family budget
is excessive or unreasonable; (4) [wlhether the debtor's schedules and
statement of current income and expenses reasonably and accurately
reflect the true financial condition; and (5) [w]hether the petition was
filed in good faith. °7
The court concluded that the foregoing analysis allowed courts to more
accurately determine "whether the particular debtor's case exemplifies
the real concern behind Section 707(b): abuse of the bankruptcy process
by a debtor seeking to take unfair advantage of his creditors." 0 8 The
court did acknowledge, however, that a debtor's ability to pay may give
rise to an inference of abuse (i.e., a primary factor).0 9 Nonetheless,
given the § 707(b) presumption of granting the debtor Chapter 7 relief,
"solvency alone is not a sufficient basis for finding that the debtor has
in fact substantially abused the provisions of Chapter [Seven]."" 0
Therefore, even if the debtor has the ability to pay, other factors must
be considered. In the court's opinion, the adoption of the per se rule
would effectively render this presumption "toothless.""' The court,
thus, reversed the bankruptcy court and remanded the case with
light of the statutory presumpinstructions to apply the five
2 factors in
tion in favor of the debtor."
Several years after Green, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit was forced to determine the 3applicable standard of4
In In re Stewart,"
"substantial abuse" as provided in § 707(b).1
the Tenth Circuit decided that "substantial-abuse analysis must be made
on a case-by-case basis," and, therefore, it adopted the totality of the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 571.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id.
In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1999).
175 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1999).
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circumstances standard as established in Green."5 In this case,
Stewart was a married man with four children. He performed various
jobs and attended college on occasion; consequently, he and his wife
maintained a minimal standard of living. Stewart was eventually
accepted to medical school. During his stint at medical school, Stewart
became romantically involved with another student. He and his wife
were later divorced. The marital settlement agreement provided that
Stewart was to pay $500 per month in alimony while he was still in
school and $25,000 annually thereafter; further, Stewart was to pay
$2000 child support plus expenses relating to his children's medical and
future college expenses." 6
Stewart took out a loan to pay past student loans and to satisfy
obligations under the marital agreement. Also, independent from the
agreement, Stewart signed two promissory notes to his ex-wife's parents
for loans they had made to he and his ex-wife while they were married.
After graduating medical school, Stewart attempted to vacate the
marital settlement agreement. The divorce court refused to do so and
shortly thereafter Stewart filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7.
The schedules showed debts totaling over $2.5 million. Instead of
practicing medicine, in which he would have a substantial earning
capacity, Stewart opted to enter a fellowship program providing far less
compensation. The trustee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
Stewart's petition for substantial abuse under § 707(b).
The bankruptcy
17
court granted this motion and Stewart appealed.
The Tenth Circuit started its analysis of "substantial abuse" under
§ 707(b) by looking to other circuits, "which agree the debtor's ability to
repay his debts out of future earnings is a primary factor in determining
if substantial abuse occurred.""' After surveying various circuits and
their respective reasoning, the court adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" standard." 9 The court stated that, "[wihile we agree
ability to pay is a primary factor in determining whether 'substantial
abuse' occurred, we believe other relevant or contributing factors, such
as unique hardships, must also be examined ....Conversely, where an

inability to pay exists, we believe other factors may nevertheless
establish substantial abuse." 2 °

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

809.
799-801.
801-02.
808.
809.
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In applying this standard, the court initially determined that Stewart
was financially able to "pay his expenses and repay his debt within a
reasonable time."'' The court noted that under these circumstances,
a debtor seeking to discharge debt evidences "substantial abuse" under
§ 707(b). 122 The court then analyzed the other factors similar to those
enumerated in Green. 2 ' The court concluded that Stewart had not
suffered any unique hardships; conversely, he lived an extravagant
lifestyle outside of his ability to repay.'2 4 Moreover, Stewart's actual
expenses were "clearly excessive and [could] be reduced."125 Finally,
the court addressed Stewart's good faith. 126 It noted that Stewart filed
his petition immediately after unsuccessful litigation with his exwife.' 27 He also sought "to discharge his legal obligation to pay his
children's college expenses even though his in-laws provided him money
over a twelve-year period so he could pursue his own education." 28
The court noted further evidence of bad faith in the fact that Stewart
pursued a fellowship that paid substantially less than his earning
potential with the knowledge that he would be able to enjoy higher
income in the future. 29 As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
dismissal under § 707(b) for substantial abuse. 30
The "totality of the circumstances" analysis, as demonstrated in Green
and Stewart, is in direct opposition to the per se rule in that the per se
rule prohibits dismissal under § 707(b) solely on the basis of the debtor's
ability to pay out of future earnings. The reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit is persuasive given the existence of the § 707(b) presumption of
granting Chapter 7 relief. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Green and
Stewart, although some courts have held other variables important in
determining "substantial abuse," these courts have been unable to ignore
the obvious influence of one particular factor-the debtor's ability to

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
These other factors include, but are not limited to: (1) sudden illness, calamity,
disability, unemployment; (2) cash advances and consumer purchases in far excess
of ability to repay; (3) excessive or unreasonable family budget; (4) accurate
reflection of true financial condition in the debtor's schedules and statements of
income and expenses; and (5) the debtor's good faith.
124. Id. ("Dr. Stewart lived an extravagant lifestyle, spending $4,500 more than his
monthly take-home pay.").
125. Id. at 810.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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repay debts. The influential value of this factor, together with the
recognition that other variables may play a role in a finding of "substantial abuse," has resulted in an approach incorporating concepts behind
both the per se rule and the totality of the circumstances standard-the
hybrid approach.
3. Hybrid Approach. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopted a different analysis under the rubric
of "totality of the circumstances." 1 ' Under this rubric, dismissal for
substantial abuse "may" be based solely on the debtor's ability to pay out
of future earnings, but, unlike the per se rule, other variables are
considered relevant to the substantial abuse analysis.13
For these
reasons, the Author is, therefore, referring to the following approach as
a "hybrid." This "hybrid" analysis has been followed by the Sixth, Ninth,
and First Circuits. 33
In In re Krohn,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit determined that a debtor's Chapter 7 petition could be dismissed
for substantial abuse under § 707(b) because of the debtor's ability to
pay debts out of future income and dishonesty.' 35 In Krohn the debtor
("Krohn") filed for Chapter 7 relief. Thereafter, a hearing was scheduled
in which Krohn was to reaffirm an unsecured debt to Society National
Bank in exchange for the latter financing the purchase of Krohn's new
home. As a result of the hearing, the bankruptcy court reviewed Krohn's
case and sua sponte dismissed
it under § 707(b). The district court
13
affirmed and Krohn appealed. 1
The Sixth Circuit first determined that the applicability of §707(b)
should be "ascertain[ed] from the totality of the circumstances." 3 ' The
court elaborated that analysis of the totality of the circumstances should
indicate whether the debtor is simply

131. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989).
132. Id. at 126-27.
133. Lamanna, 153 F.3d at 4. The First Circuit purported to adopt the "totality of the
circumstances" test as described in Krohn and rejected any "per se" rule mandating
dismissal whenever the debtor was determined to have the ability to pay; however, the
First Circuit concluded that a bankruptcy court could, but is not required to, dismiss a case
under § 707(b) solely on the basis of the debtor having the ability to pay. Thus, unlike the
true "totality of the circumstances" test as established in Green, a bankruptcy court
following the decision in Lamanna could dismiss a case for substantial abuse upon finding
the debtor has ability to pay and it would not necessarily have to analyze other factors.
134. 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 126.
136. Id. at 125.
137. Id. at 126.
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advantage over his creditors, or instead is "honest," in the
his relationship with his creditors has been marked by
honorable and undeceptive dealings, and whether he is
the sense that his financial predicament warrants the
138
his debts in exchange for liquidation of his assets.
of
discharge
seeking an
sense that
essentially
"needy" in

The court divided this analysis of the debtor's "honesty" and "need"
into two separate inquiries.'3 9 The court stated that every specific
40
However,
factor relevant to the debtor's honesty could not be listed.
the court did provide some general factors: "the debtor's good faith and
candor in filing schedules and other documents, whether he has engaged
in 'eve of bankruptcy purchases,' and whether he was forced into
4
Chapter [Seven] by unforeseen or catastrophic events."' ' As to the
debtor's "neediness," the court held the primary factor to be his ability
142
In fact, the court concluded
to pay debts out of future earnings.
43
that, "[that factor alone may be sufficient to warrant dismissal."
Nevertheless, the court further enumerated other variables relevant to
the debtor's need:
[1] whether the debtor enjoys a stable source of future income, [2]
whether he is eligible for adjustment of his debts through Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code, [3] whether there are state remedies with the
potential to ease his financial predicament, [4] the degree of relief
obtainable through private negotiations, and (5] whether his expenses
can be reduced significantly without depriving him of adequate food,
clothing, shelter and other necessities.'"
In the case at bar, the bankruptcy court justified dismissal under
45
§ 707(b) based on Krohn's perceived dishonesty and bad faith.'
Krohn's schedules provided for a monthly income of $4015 with monthly
expenditures of $3950. Among these monthly expenditures were over
$1000 for dining out and recreation, almost $170 for cosmetics, $66.49
Further, the debtor made
for cigars, and over $670 for clothes.
46
current.
minimum monthly payments merely to keep his accounts
The bankruptcy court found there "to be no 'eve of bankruptcy purchases'

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 127.
Id.
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but rather a consistent pattern of living on credit or beyond the debtor's
means." 147 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court's findings
and reasoning.'4 The court, however, provided other factors to further
support dismissal of Krohn's case due to substantial abuse-his
significant future income, the fact that his financial situation was not
event, and the excessive nature of his
the product of a catastrophic
14
expenses after filing.
Despite the Sixth Circuit's listings of various circumstantial factors,
the court's primary inquiry was the debtor's ability to pay debts because,
as it implied, this factor alone (without inquiry into the debtor's
surrounding circumstances) could warrant dismissal under § 707(b) for
Unlike the "totality of the circumstances"
substantial abuse. 50
analysis, the Sixth Circuit's hybrid approach, as exemplified in Krohn,
allows dismissal under § 707(b) solely on the basis of the debtor's ability
In Green the Fourth Circuit, applying
to pay out of future earnings.'
the totality of the circumstances approach, strictly forbade dismissal
based merely on the debtor's ability to pay out of future income.'52
Nonetheless, like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit's hybrid approach
acknowledges the importance of the totality of the circumstances.
Whereas the Fourth Circuit addresses these variables in a succinct
analysis of five factors, the Sixth Circuit divides the analysis of the
variables into separate inquiries (honesty and neediness) with the
debtor's ability to pay weighing heavily in favor of dismissal.
In In re Price, 5' the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit initially appeared to be following a traditional totality of the
circumstances approach similar to that applied in Green.' However,
it later clarified its interpretation of "substantial abuse" under § 707(b)
as being a "hybrid approach" (although it did not expressly state so).' 55
In this case, the debtor (Price) was a computer consultant who owned his
own business. Along with his consulting business, Price financed several
business ventures with his then wife through cash and credit card
advances. Thereafter, both his business and his wife's businesses failed.
He and his wife divorced, after which he began working for a larger
computer consulting firm earning a salary of $115,000 per year. When

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
See id. at 126.
See id.
See Green, 934 F.2d at 572.
353 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1139-40.
Id. at 1140.
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he failed to pay debts as they became due, Price filed a voluntary
petition under Chapter 7.156 Price's schedules "listed total debts of
$322,552.81, $167,469 of which was secured debt, $19,356.50 priority
debt, and $135,727.31 unsecured nonpriority debt. " 15 7 As to Price's
income, he stated that although his monthly gross income was over
$10,700, his monthly net was $7,200.18 Price further "indicated that
he had $4,775.97 in current monthly expenditures, which left $2,497.37
in disposable income."' 59 Based on the foregoing figures, the trustee
moved to dismiss Price's petition for substantial abuse under § 707(b).
The bankruptcy court found that Price's debts were primarily consumer
in nature; and because he had the ability to pay his debts out of future
income, it would be an abuse of Chapter 7 to allow him to proceed.
Consequently, the bankruptcy court dismissed his petition. Price
appealed.'
The Ninth Circuit initially acknowledged, in its opinion, that
"substantial abuse" in § 707(b) was not defined by the Code.' 6' The
court then gave the impression that it was going to follow some form of
the "totality of the circumstances" approach in determining the existence
of substantial abuse.'62 The court enumerated the following criteria:
(1) Whether the debtor has likelihood of sufficient future income to
fund Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan which would pay a substantial portion
of the unsecured claims; (2) [wjhether the debtor's petition was filed as
a consequence of illness, disability, unemployment, or some other
calamity; (3) [w]hether the schedules suggest the debtor obtained cash
advancements and consumer goods on credit exceeding his or her
ability to repay them; (4) [wlhether the debtor's proposed family budget
is excessive or extravagant; (5) [wlhether the debtor's statement of
income and expenses is misrepresentative of the debtor's financial
condition; and (6) [w]hether the debtor has engaged in eve-of-bankruptcy purchases."
The court looked to its decision in In re Kelly, wherein it held "that a
'debtor's ability to pay his debts will, standing alone, justify a section
707(b) dismissal. '" 6 4 Thus, the debtor's ability to pay his debts under

156.
157.

Id. at 1137.
Id.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1138.
161. Id. at 1139.

162.

See id. at 1139-40.

163. Id. at 1139-40 (quoting WILLIAM L. NORTON, 3 NORTON BANKRuPTcY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 67:5, 67-10 (2d ed. 1997)).
164. Id. at 1140 (quoting Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914).
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a Chapter 13 plan is the primary factor in determining substantial
abuse." 5 However, the court qualified this statement by concluding

that "Kelly did not establish an absolute, per se rule."66 Instead, the

"ability to fund a Chapter [Thirteen] plan is the most important
consideration under § 707(b), and ...a finding of ability to pay alone is
sufficient to sustain a § 707(b) dismissal." 1 7 But such a finding does
Subsequently, the court held that the banknot compel dismissal."
ruptcy court "was well justified in relying on... [Price's ability to pay
under § 707(b)." 69
his debts] in ordering dismissal of the petition
170
dismissal.
affirmed
court
the
Consequently,
Like the "totality of the circumstances" approach, the "hybrid
approach" emphasizes the importance of various factors surrounding the
debtor's Chapter 7 filing. But there, the similarities between the two
approaches depart-unlike the totality of the circumstances approach,
the hybrid approach allows dismissal based solely on the debtor's ability
to pay his debts, without inquiry into those surrounding factors.
However the totality of the circumstances analysis restricts a § 707(b)
substantial abuse analysis to expressly enumerated factors, and it
prohibits dismissal solely on the basis of the debtor's solvency (or ability
to fund a Chapter 13 plan). Under the hybrid approach, a court is able
to take into account the surrounding circumstances (certain factors)
along with the debtor's solvency; further, the court is not prohibited from
dismissing a debtor's case based on his solvency. Nevertheless, as stated
by the Ninth Circuit in Price, such a finding of ability to pay "does not
compel a section 707(b) dismissal of the petition as a matter of law."''
Thus, a bankruptcy judge sitting in the Sixth, Ninth, and First Circuits
has the most discretion in determining substantial abuse: the judge can
simply focus on the debtor's ability to pay or look at other factors
surrounding the filing.
The diversity of approaches taken to determine dismissal under
§ 707(b) for substantial abuse demonstrates the inherent (and likely
purposeful) ambiguity in the statutory language. On one hand, there is
the simple and lucid per se rule that authorizes dismissal solely on the
basis that the debtor is able to fund a Chapter 13 plan. However, as
stated in Green, this rule would seemingly dissolve § 707(b) presumption

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1140.
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of granting the debtor Chapter 7 relief. On the other hand, there is the
analysis of the debtor and the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding his or her petition. Despite the apparent equitable nature of this
case-by-case approach, courts cannot seem to come to a consensus as to
how determinative certain factors are, which is evidenced by the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits' hybrid approach. The lack of uniformity in the
application of § 707(b) leaves honest debtors wishing to file for relief
under Chapter 7 in the uncertain position of not knowing what
constitutes "substantial abuse." There is a solution to this compromising
situation-the application of a universal, objective standard of "substantial abuse."
III.

A.

MEANS-TESTING--THE SOLUTION?

ProposedReform Bill

The purpose of a "means-test" is to check for "projected surplus
income." 172 If a debtor's "income exceeds allowed expenses by a certain
minimum amount," that debtor is "deemed to have the 'means' to repay
[their] creditors.' 73 Therefore, as reformers argue, a debtor with even
a minimal amount of projected surplus income should be prohibited from
obtaining a discharge under Chapter 7 simply by liquidating his or her
That debtor's only remaining bankruptcy
nonexempt assets. 174
alternative would be to proceed under Chapter 13.'5
Reformers assert that the discretion of bankruptcy judges should be
limited in screening debtors for ability to pay. 1 6 Unlike § 707(b),
which establishes a presumption of allowing the debtor to proceed under
Chapter 7, "the new statute would create a presumption of abuse if the
debtor has a certain level of projected income in excess of allowable
expenses." 1 77 This presumption of abuse is triggered according to the
following calculation: "Net monthly income ... multiplied by 60 months
... is not less than the lesser of (1) 25% of the debtor's nonpriority
178
unsecured claims, or $6000, whichever is greater, or (2) $10,o00."
If the debtor is unable to rebut this presumption, "the court must
dismiss the case, unless the debtor avails herself of the 'option' to

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Williams, supra note 1, at 119.
Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 19.
Id. (citing Reform Bill § 102(a)(2)(C)).
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convert to chapter [Thirteen]."' 79 Because bankruptcy judges' discretion is limited, a debtor would not likely be able to rebut this presumption. A debtor can only rebut the presumption by proving "special
circumstances" that require an adjustment sufficient "to drop the
debtor's sixty-month net income below the presumptive abuse
amounts."'
To do this, a debtor must not only show that "she has 'no
reasonable alternative' to making the adjustment," but must also8 provide
itemized documentation explaining each asserted adjustment.'1
B.

Critique

The means-test calculation would replace the § 707(b) "substantial
abuse" analysis currently used by courts. A court would have an
objective measure of deciding whether to allow the debtor to proceed
under Chapter 7; and, given the discrepancy in the interpretation of
§ 707(b), this method of analyzing a debtor's ability appears warranted.
Nevertheless, there are several discrepancies in this means-testing
calculation.
First, "the required repayment period is pegged at five years (60
months)-an expansion of sixty-seven percent over the current presumptive three-year length of a chapter [Thirteen] plan." 8 2 This extension
of two years does not accurately reflect the repayment period a debtor
would (likely) be subject to under Chapter 13.183 As the majority of
debtors in Chapter 13 fail to fully perform under a three-year plan, there
appears to be no support that a debtor should be judged against a fiveyear payment period." Second, for this five year presumptive period,
"the test assumes that nothing will change regarding the debtor's income
and expenses."'
Occupational status and compensation are presumed
to be stable; this is not reasonable, especially given today's unpredictable
economy. Third, if a debtor is able to repay $10,000 over the five-year
period he is presumptively an abuser, "no matter how small a percentage
of his debt that represents."8 6 Thus, "any debtor with net income of
$166.67 a month is presumptively barred from chapter [Seven]

179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 29-30.
181. Id. at 30.
182. Id. at 19.
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (stating that "[the plan may not provide for payments
over a period that is longer than three years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer
period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than five years.").
184. Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 19.
185. Id. at 20.
186. Id.
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relief."18 7 Despite these seemingly blatant discrepancies, supporters
are pushing for the enactment of the Reform Bill 188 (with its meanstesting provision).
Another concern if the means-test were implemented is the position
the seemingly honest debtor is left in when he or she is denied Chapter
7 relief. Where a debtor is precluded from filing under Chapter 7
because he has some projected surplus income (however modest that
amount may be), the only option left for him under auspices of bankruptcy law is Chapter 13.
The Bankruptcy Code only authorizes the involuntary commencement
of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case. 189 Therefore, under the Code as
currently written, a debtor cannot be forced into a Chapter 13. However,
if the means-test were enacted, a debtor ineligible under Chapter 7,
would be left with only one bankruptcy alternative-Chapter 13.
Consequently, creditors could in essence force a debtor to file a Chapter
13 petition by involuntarily commencing a Chapter 7 case and when the
debtor fails the means-test, the debtor is left with the Hobson's choice of
either filing a Chapter 13 petition and obtaining relief under the
bankruptcy laws or allowing state-law collection procedures to take
place. Such a situation reeks of indentured servitude as creditors could
force their debtors to "work-off" debt through enforced payment plans.
It is hard to fathom that America's financial system, as much as it has
progressed in the last two hundred years, would revert to a system
based more on feudalism than constitutional notions of freedom and
fairness. The framers of the laws should be cognizant of one of the
founding basis of the United States of America: avoidance of debtor's
prisons.
The means-test, as proposed in the Reform Bill, takes away judges'
discretion by establishing objective criteria to determine "substantial
abuse." Nevertheless, it appears to create as many problems as it solves
and those problems it creates seem to unfairly prejudice individual
debtors. Admittedly, there is inherent ambiguity in § 707(b) as
demonstrated by the discrepancy in the application of "substantial
abuse." And undoubtedly, a "Can-Pay" debtor problem does exist (to
some extent)-where the debtor does have the "substantial" means to
pay he should be prohibited from hiding behind the curtain of Chapter
7. However, not every debtor that files for Chapter 7 has the "substantial" means to pay. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts accurately

187. Id.
188. Reform Bill § 102(a)(2)(c).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2001).
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stated the current dilemma in the legislative proceedings on Bankruptcy
Reform:
We must absolutely prevent the abuse of the bankruptcy system by
millionaires whom we know have received the protections of the
bankruptcy system despite their ability to repay their debts. But even
beyond the flagrant, high-profile abuse of the bankruptcy system that
we have read about in the papers, we must also be sure that every
consumer acts responsibly and does not charge meals, vacations and
clothes that he cannot afford, only to turn to the bankruptcy system to
bail him out of his debt. At the same time, we must not forget that a
fresh start in bankruptcy serves a valuable purpose for many individuals who truly need its protections. When an individual gets into
financial trouble because, for example, she has catastrophic, unforeseen
medical expenses, it is better for her, for her creditors and even for
society as a whole if she is given an opportunity to have her debts
discharged and is given a fresh start.9 0
Senator Kerry voiced the tentative balance between prohibiting the
wealthy from unfairly using Chapter 7 to discharge debts that they have
the means to pay and maintaining the "fresh-start" ideal for the honest
debtor. Nevertheless, the majority of the population having to file
bankruptcy are not the wealthy, but the working, middle-class.19 ' A
study published in the journal Health Affais, "estimated that medical
bankruptcies affect about [two] million Americans every year, if both
debtors and their dependents, including about 700,000 children, are
counted."' 92 Dr. David Himmelstein, the individual who led the study
and an associate professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School, found
that most individuals having to file bankruptcy were average Americans
who were forced to file for medical reasons.'9 3 Dr. Himmelstein's
researchers surveyed 931 people who filed for bankruptcy in California,
Almost half of those
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.'
polled asserted that medical causes were the reason they filed, "which
indicates that 1.9 to 2.2 million Americans (filers plus dependents)

190. Senator John Kerry on Bankruptcy Reform, published at 23-AUG AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 6 (August 23, 2004).
191. See CNN Money, Study: Health Costs Spur Bankruptcy (February 2, 2005),
availableat http://moneymoney.cnn.com/2005/02/02pf/debt/health~bankruptcy.reut/index.
htm?cnn=yes.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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Bill
experienced medical bankruptcy."9 ' Thus, "[u]nless [you are]
196
Gates [you are] just one serious illness away from bankruptcy."
The foregoing study appears to support the continued use of judicial
discretion in determining "substantial abuse" under § 707(b). A rigid
"means-test" would preclude many honest, middle-class debtors (whom
are the majority of bankruptcy filers) from taking advantage of Chapter
7 if they happen to have even a modest amount of future surplus income.
Therefore, a means-test would be like a fish net, with the netting being
too small. If a fisherman only desires to catch prize tuna, he should
make the netting large enough so that only larger tuna are caught in the
net and not smaller, unwanted fish. Likewise, if the government only
wishes to prohibit wealthy individuals from utilizing Chapter 7, it should
increase the amount of the means-test's threshold figures. Alternatively,
the government could simply allow the courts to use their discretion.
One would hope that whichever judiciary approach to § 707(b) currently
applied (per se rule, totality of the circumstances approach, or hybrid
approach), a court is able to look to equity and find wealthy individuals
to be substantially abusing Chapter 7. Thus, why implement a means
test that could capture and punish a debtor with only modest future
surplus income?

IV. BIG MONEY PRESSURES-THE PUSH FOR REFORM
A.

HistoricalPressures

Prior to 1984, the only means for dismissal of a Chapter 7 case was for
"cause" under § 707(a).19 v As stated above, § 707(b) was added to the
Code in 1984 to pacify the credit industry's concerns about perceived
abuses of Chapter 7. 11 However, the form of § 707(b) on the books
today is not that for which the credit industry lobbied.1 99 In fact,
"Congress rejected attempts by the consumer credit industry to permit
creditors to move for dismissal of cases on the basis that the debtor had
an ability to pay debts." 00° Congress also refused to incorporate the
credit industry's following proposals: that a case should be dismissed
based on the debtor's ability to pay a "reasonable portion" of his debts

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
VI COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 707-32 (15th ed. rev. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1981)).
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(i.e., 50 percent) and that a five year period should
be the time frame to
20 1
determine whether the portion could be paid.
The adoption of § 707(b) in its current form is "the result of legislative
compromise."0 2 Indeed, § 707(b) is probably a great deal more narrow
than the credit industry initially sought.0 3 But, considering that the
only previous authority for dismissal was "for cause," the industry was
likely more content with § 707(b) than it would otherwise be. Nonetheless, because the credit industry believes that the vagueness of the
substantial abuse test and procedural restrictions have weakened the
effectiveness of § 707(b), the credit industry is once again lobbying
Congress. Unlike former attempts to reform, though, the credit industry
has a specific aim-circumscribing judicial discretion-as this has been
the likely obstacle preventing the complete alleviation of the Can-Pay
debtor problem.
B.

History Repeating Itself?-Reform Without the Compromise

Those supporting the Reform Bill espouse that the purpose behind the
bill is "'fixing the bankruptcy crisis. '' 20 4 This crisis purportedly exists
"'because of (1) the substantial rise in the number of consumer
bankruptcy filings in the United States in recent years and (2) the
substantial losses allegedly 'caused' by those filings. ' ' 20 5 Reformers
blame the cause of this crisis on debtors.0 6 Specifically, "that debtors
are abusing the law by taking out too much credit, living the high life,
and sliding down the easy path of discharge when they could repay a
significant portion of their debts." 0 7 This portrayal of a "crisis" is
"exaggerated and factually unsupported." °8
The overwhelming
majority of Chapter 7 filings are the result of "medical problems, divorce,
or job layoffs."20 9
Despite the evidence dispelling the existence of a bankruptcy crisis,
the credit industry is again (similar to pre-1984) lobbying Congress to
act. However, unlike 1984, it appears the credit industry will not be
satisfied with a "compromise" on the books. Between 1997 and 2001,

201. Id. (citing S. 445,98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 203 (1983); S. 2000,97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 18(c) (1982)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 707-33.
204. Tabb, Death of Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 35, at 13 (quoting S. Rep. No.
106-49, at 2 (1999)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 14.
209. Id. (citingA Bad Bankruptcy Bill, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Mar. 15, 2001, at A26.)
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"the finance industry has spent an estimated $5 million on lobbying for
the bankruptcy bill and over $20 million in political contributions, with
$2.2 million in contributions just to members of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees (which have responsibility for bankruptcy
legislation).""' In fact, "Republican Congressman Bill McCollum, who
introduced the first means testing bill in 1997, received $225,000 from
the consumer credit industry."21 1 Moreover, the consumer credit giant
contributor to President Bush's
"MBNA was the single largest21 corporate
2
2000 presidential campaign."
Republicans have notoriously catered to the concerns of big business.
Now, with republicans controlling the presidency and Congress as a
result of the 2004 election, it is very likely that the credit industry will
be able to exert its influence and push the passage of the Reform Bill
(with its means-test provision). Thus, the implementation of a meanstest in lieu of § 707(b) may be more of a question of "when" than "if."
But that question aside, this author is concerned about the practices of
the consumer credit industry as being a direct cause of its so-called
"plight."

V. ANALYSIS
A.

Whose Fault Is It Anyway?

One does not have to be an expert in statistics to find the following
statement logical: studies have shown "that the increase in the number
of consumer bankruptcies is closely correlated with the increase in the
amount of outstanding consumer credit, and with the rate of credit card
defaults."21 The more readily available consumer credit is made by
the industry, the easier it becomes for individual consumers to find
themselves in debt. While the consumer credit industry would argue
that the availability of credit not only benefits individual consumers but
also the economy as a whole by increasing buying power, it would likely
ignore the potentially disastrous position a consumer could find himself
in when his credit limit exceeds his income. As any individual consumer

210. Id. at 46 (citing UnfairBankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A34).
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A34).
213. Id. at 14 (citing Robert M. Lawless, The Relationship Between Nonbusiness
Bankruptcy Filings and Various Measures of ConsumerDebt, at http://www.law.missouri.edu/lawless/bus<uscore>bkr/filings.htm (Version 1.1, last updated July 18, 2001);
Lawraence M. Ausubel, CreditCard Defaults, Credit CardProfits,and Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 249, 250 (1997)).
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with a credit card can testify, there is a credit limit when one initially
obtains a credit card. However, if the cardholder uses the card and
makes timely payments, the creditor generally increases this limit. For
an unsuspecting individual with little understanding of the concept of
compounding interest, this can be both a blessing and curse-the
individual is blessed with an increased ability to purchase goods but
cursed with a larger amount upon which interest is accrued.
The credit industry makes credit readily available to individual
consumers by "flooding them with endless solicitations to take on more
and ever more credit."21 4 A 2001 study found that "approximately
three billion solicitations for credit cards were mailed every year."215
This breaks down to "an average of nearly twenty offers for every single
American between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four." 21' Another
study conducted in 2001 determined that "one-third of all college
students had four or more credit cards."2 17 Credit card issuers are
quite active in their marketing of credit to individual consumers, "often
without worrying much about the debtor's creditworthiness."218
Indeed, because of these shocking numbers, the Author (a law student
with no outside source of income) decided to keep every credit card
solicitation from the time he began this Comment. From October 2,
2004 through January 23, 2005, the Author received twenty-eight
separate solicitations for pre-approved credit cards. Some of these
solicitations offered a pre-approved credit limit of as much as $4,000!
Others advertised credit lines of as much as $50,000. Why does the
consumer credit industry do this? Simple, credit card issuers make a
large amount of money21 9 Despite inundating individual consumers
when some
with credit offers, "credit issuers express consternation
220
debtors are unable to pay the crushing debt load."
Certainly, consumer debtors are not totally blameless; one has to
practice discretion when using credit. Nevertheless, the credit industry
cannot play the part of the naive victim. An analogy can be made to a
"kid in a candy store." The proprietor of the candy store is more

214. Id.
215. Id. at 15 (citing Consumer Federation of America, Credit CardIssuersAggressively
Expand Marketing and Lines of Credit on Eve of New Bankruptcy Restrictions, Feb. 27,
2001, at http://www.abiworld.org/travpr.pdf).
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Debra J. Saunders, Of Puppies, Kittens, and Huge Credit-cardDebts,
SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., May 22, 2001, at A21 (citing report by credit-card research firm
BAI Global Credit Inc.)).
218. Id. at 17.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 15.
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knowledgeable than the child and is aware of consequences that can
result from certain actions (i.e., eating too much candy). If the child
comes into the candy store with twenty dollars, the proprietor can
maximize his profit by taking the child's money and giving the child
twenty dollars worth of candy, or the proprietor can make a marginal
profit by selling the child only an amount of candy that will satisfy the
child's sweet tooth. In the former situation, the proprietor is concerned
only with his bottom line and will sell the child twenty dollars worth of
candy knowing that the child will likely eat until he becomes ill. Such
a proprietor cannot play the part of an innocent bystander when the
child's parent asks him why the child is ill. However, the proprietor also
has the choice of making a profit while not putting the child's well-being
at risk by limiting the child to only a specified amount of candy.
Similarly, the consumer credit industry has a comparable choice
(albeit on a far grander scale). The sophisticated credit industry could
limit an individual consumer's credit opportunities and credit limits
according to each individual's specific situation (i.e., income, occupational
status, etc.), or the credit industry could simply give out credit without
discretion. Both of the foregoing options allow the consumer credit
industry to make a profit, but the latter alternative is concerned only
with making a profit. When the consumer credit industry chooses this
latter alternative and divvies out credit like candy with little restraint,
it should not be allowed to complain when individuals get stomach aches
and are unable to pay. The Author is cognizant of our capitalistic
society and the fact that businesses exist for the purpose of making a
profit. Thus, in both the candy store proprietorship example and the
consumer credit industry there is a desire to maximize profit. Nonetheless, a business's ability to make this profit should not be at the
detriment of the very people the industry (or the proprietorship) relies
upon to exist. In other words, an individual consumer should not be
placed in a position that is worse off than the position he was in prior
to utilizing credit.
Reform Without Legislation
When a person reasonably well versed in the law thinks of reform,
legislation generally comes to mind. Reformers who desire to revamp
the "substantial abuse" analysis of Chapter 7 by replacing § 707(b) with
the means-test consider legislation to be the only way to alleviate the
"Can-Pay" debtor problem. Reformers refuse to admit that certain
actions, short of legislation, can be taken by the consumer credit
industry itself, which could dramatically affect the pervasiveness of the
"Can-Pay" debtor dilemma.
B.
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First, the consumer credit industry could monitor their own behavior.221 This monitoring would entail "being more responsible and
diligent in selecting those to whom they extend credit."222 Instead of
merely actively marketing credit to individual consumers without
question, the credit industry could tailor the offering of credit according
to each consumer's creditworthiness. In this way, an individual debtor
would not have the ability to accrue debt in excess of his means to repay.
The consumer credit industry currently refuses to do this for the simple
Credit card
fact that they want to increase their bottom-line.223
issuers "make a lot of money by charging extremely high interest rates
to their legions of debtors."224 The fact "[tihat a certain percentage of
those debtors will default is already factored in to the high interest rates
charged." 225 So what effect will the implementation of the means-test
have on the consumer credit industries soliciting and extending credit?
The credit industry "can be expected to become more aggressive ...
because the226credit issuer would have less reason to fear a bankruptcy
discharge. ,
Second, the consumer credit industry could be required to disclose
more information to individual consumers to whom they solicit. 227 The
idea is that armed with this information, consumers could make more
informed choices about which credit issuer to use and even whether to
use credit at all. Many times debtors use bankruptcy discharge because
they were "not able to make accurate forecasts about the likelihood of
future defaults." 228 Debtors are notorious for "underestimat[ing] future
Some have
risks and overestimat[ing] their future prospects."22 9
suggested that credit card issuers should be required to "disclose in a
conspicuous manner how long it w[ould] take a debtor to pay off the
balance if they make only the minimum payments required." 23 ° Yet,

221. Id. at 17.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means
Testing as a Distractionand the NationalBankruptcy Review Commission'sProposalas a
Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998)).
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (1985)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 18.
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even23 1this simple idea has been rejected by the consumer credit industry.

The debate concerning § 707(b) involves a clash between "two
techniques used in legal theory to constrain judicial discretion-rules
and standards."2 2 Both rules and standards curb the discretion of the
decision-maker."' Whereas "[r]ules are perceived as outcome determinative" because they require the "decision-maker to classify and label,
*

.

. [s]tandards are not perceived as outcome determinative" because the

outcome is determined by a number of factors.234 The central idea
behind the means-testing debate "turns on how much discretion the
superior authority [Congress] wishes to grant to the decision-maker
[Judiciary] on the bankruptcy frontline." 235 The enactment of a meanstest would "limit the discretion of a decision-maker by fixing or requiring
[the application of a] rule

[].,236

The means-test, like other rules, is

"designed to confine [the] decision-maker to the role of sifting through
the facts of a case."237 Such a role generally removes any involvement
of subjective value choices. 23" To the contrary, "standards are generally perceived as indeterminate." 239 Standards embody the notions
behind common-law by allowing, and even encouraging, the decisionmaker to have a wide-range of discretion (legal, political, and otherwise).240
The current analysis of "substantial abuse" under § 707(b) is a
standard in that it is "not committed to a fixed protocol."2 41 Courts of

Appeals are free to interpret "substantial abuse" as best they see fit,
which is illustrated by the multitude of approaches: per se rule, totality
of the circumstances approach, and hybrid approach. The decisionmaker is thus "free to minimize the risk of error from the over-andunder inclusiveness endemic in a rule."242 As a standard, reformers
First, by
have vehemently argued that § 707(b) has drawbacks.
"injects
discretion,
one
wide-ranging
to
use
allowing a decision-maker

231. Id.
232. Williams, supra note 1, at 119 (citations omitted).
233. Id. (citing Jeffery Blum et. al., Comment, Cases that Shock the Conscience:
Reflections on Criticism of the Burger Court, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 713, 715 (1980)).
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 120.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citations omitted).
238. Id.
239. Id. (citations omitted).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 121.
242. Id.
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another type of error to the decision making process; namely, error from
bias and incompetence."2 43 Second, "standards may provide less notice
of what is expected of parties in interest."2 " Despite these drawbacks,
"[s]tandards are arguably fairer than rules because they promote
substantive justice and equality."2 45 Moreover, rules "do not advance
a debate over issues, nor do they allow the law to grow through new
cases and observations."2 46 Often, "[a] rule is perceived as the death
of thought," whereas "standards further the law's system of thought2 by
47
exposing judges, litigants, and society to the rationale of outcomes."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current state of determining "substantial abuse" under § 707(b)
is riddled with inconsistent applications. Section 707(b) provides no
clear guidance as to how a court should analyze whether a debtor is
substantially abusing Chapter 7. Consequently, courts are left with the
chore of interpreting "substantial abuse" in their own manner. The
Eighth Circuit applies the per se rule in which the court simply looks at
the debtor's finances-if the debtor has the ability to fund a Chapter 13
payment plan that debtor will be determined to be substantially abusing
Chapter 7. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits, however, have held that the
"substantial abuse" analysis should involve an analysis of the "totality
of the circumstances." Although the debtor's solvency is a primary factor
in this analysis, other factors must be considered, and the court may not
dismiss the debtor's Chapter 7 case based solely on his or her ability to
fund a Chapter 13 payment plan. Still further, the First, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits apply a hybrid approach to the § 707(b) substantial abuse
analysis. Under this approach, the court looks at both the circumstances
surrounding the debtor's Chapter 7 petition and the debtor's solvency.
Unlike the totality of the circumstances approach, a court adhering to
the hybrid approach may dismiss the debtor's case for substantial abuse
solely on the debtor's solvency (i.e., ability to fund a Chapter 13 payment
plan).
Reformers argue that the existence of the foregoing discrepancy in the
application of § 707(b) demonstrates the need for an objective test
(specifically, means-testing) as courts currently have too much discretion
in applying § 707(b). Thus, as reformers assert, a simple, bright-line
mathematical formula should be implemented. But, the implementation

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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of such a formula would severely impair honest debtors' ability to utilize
Chapter 7. A debtor with even a modicum amount of future surplus
income would be precluded from filing under Chapter 7. Moreover, the
creditors could, in essence, involuntarily commence a Chapter 13 case by
forcing a Chapter 7 liquidation, and when the debtor fails the means-test
he would only be left with the option of Chapter 13. The ability of
creditors to force a debtor to repay by "working-off" their debt eerily
resembles involuntary servitude. Such a situation appears to offend one
of the basic constitutional tenants upon which the United States is
based-freedom.
Further, the enactment of a means-test through legislation seems a bit
premature considering the consumer credit industry's practices-endless
solicitation, exorbitant credit limits, refusing to provide information
about credit to unaware consumers, etc. One would think that the
logical remedy to the consumer credit industry's complaints would be
self-restraint. But when self-restraint is equated with lost profits,
legislation becomes the next answer. And when you have the money to
lobby Congress, who cares what is actually good for John D. Consumer,
right?
In the Author's opinion, § 707(b) should remain on the books as it
currently appears-as a standard. The enactment of a means-test would
be tantamount to creating a rigid rule, from which no deviation is
allowed. Courts would be at the mercy of a fixed protocol and, therefore,
where the circumstances of a debtor's case may warrant proceeding
under Chapter 7, that debtor would be prohibited as a matter of law if
he had even a small amount of future surplus income. Nevertheless,
admittedly a Can-Pay Debtor problem does exist; albeit, to what extent
is debatable. Consequently, the substantial abuse analysis under
§ 707(b) should be "tweaked" by qualifying specific wording. Namely,
Congress should amend § 101248 to include a definition of "substantial
abuse" wherein the totality of the circumstances factors, as established
in Green, are enumerated:
(1) [w]hether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden
illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) [wihether the debtor
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of
his ability to repay; (3) [wlhether the debtor's proposed family budget
is excessive or unreasonable; (4) [wlhether the debtor's schedules and
statement of current income and expenses reasonably and accurately
condition; and (5) [wjhether the petition was
reflect the true financial
2 49
filed in good faith.

248.
249.

11 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Green, 934 F.2d at 572.
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The debtor's solvency or ability to fund a Chapter 13 payment plan
should also be enumerated and be the primary factor for the court to
consider. However, in order to adhere to the § 707(b) presumption of
allowing the debtor to proceed in Chapter 7, the court should not be
capable of dismissing the debtor's case solely based on this solvency
factor; it must address the other factors. In this way, every substantial
abuse analysis involves a case-by-case analysis and § 707(b) can be left
in place, undisturbed. Such an approach to the Can-Pay debtor problem
would be both equitable for John D. Consumer and the consumer credit
industry. John D. Consumer would have his day in court in which the
court looks not just at papers (i.e., finances), but consumer as a person
and the circumstances surrounding his filing. Thus, the availability of
Chapter 7 to John D. Consumer would be evaluated according to his
unique plight. As for the consumer credit industry, it would finally be
forced to light a candle it has long refused to light-scrutinizing its own
behavior.
J. KAz ESPY

